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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to voting, drinking, marrying, serving on a jury, or even watching movies,
society recognizes that kids are different. We restrict their privileges, we withhold certain rights,
and we require their parents to consent for certain activities. When kids on the playground bully
each other we say it's just "kids being kids," or when an adult is stressed and needs to lighten up,
we tell them to "embrace their inner child" to do something crazy or reckless. Despite all these
societal differences, however, nearly 200,000 children encounter the adult criminal justice system
each year.' Somehow, we forget about all of these important distinctions when a child commits a
crime -as if they went through every stage of puberty and grew up instantly in the five seconds it
takes to snap handcuffs on their wrists.
The Supreme Court, through a series of recent cases, has recognized that children are
constitutionally and fundamentally different than adults and therefore are more adept to reha-
bilitation than adults accused of the same crimes. Starting in 2005, with Roper c. Simmons, 2 the
Court ruled that the death penalty for juveniles was unconstitutional. In 2010, Graham c. Flor-
ida' established that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles accused of
non-homicide crimes was unconstitutional and later expanded its ruling to all crimes including
homicide in 2012 with Miller v. Alabama.' Despite these landmark rulings, however, children are
still treated as adults in the criminal system under transfer statutes that either force their cases to
be originally filed in adult criminal court or quickly move them out of the juvenile system, often
without a hearing. While they can no longer be sentenced to death or sentenced to life in prison,
children transferred to adult court are still exposed to harsh punishments, considered adults for
sentencing purposes, and not afforded the individualized considerations laid out by the Supreme
Court in its recent cases.
1 Carmen E. Daugherty, Zero Tolerance: How States Comply with PREA's Youthful Inmate Standard, Campaign
for Youth Justice, (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/news/blog/item/zero-tolerance-how-states-
comply-with-prea-s -youthful-inmate-standard.
2 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
1 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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A transfer statute is a "provision that allows or mandates the trial of a juvenile as an adult
in criminal court for a criminal act."5 All states currently have transfer laws that allow or mandate
certain youth to be transferred to adult court, even though their age places them in the category
of juvenile jurisdiction.' Even worse, many states still have mandatory transfer provisions -a type
of automatic transfer requiring juveniles to be tried in adult criminal court for certain offenses.
These provisions are codified and require a child of a certain age or who has committed a certain
offense to be tried in adult court through either mandatory waiver to adult court or through stat-
utory exclusion.' Such transfer laws are largely a result of a myth propagated in the 1990s of the
juvenile "super predator," which resulted in the adultification of youth and an increased criminal-
ization of youthful behavior.8
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the transfer of juveniles to
adult court since it first did in 1966. In Kent v. United States,9 a sixteen-year-old was transferred to
adult court without a hearing or any indication of the reasons for his transfer. The Supreme Court
ruled that the waiver was invalid, that juveniles have a right to a formal hearing that "must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." 0 Since Kent, legislatures and state courts
have continued to transfer children, often without a hearing."
This Comment will highlight the 5 0 th anniversary of the Kent decision and argue that this
decision, along with the Court's decision in Roper, Graham, and Miller, illustrate that mandatory
transfer mechanisms that do not require a court to hold a hearing prior to transferring youth are
in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 2 The Supreme Court has
recognized that children are categorically less culpable than adults for their conduct, and this differ-
ence is not based on the crime they are charged with, or the punishment they face. This Comment
will also argue that all states should repeal mandatory transfer statutes and, regardless of the crime
the youth is accused of, should only be able to transfer youth through judicial waiver after a hearing
in which the court considers a standardized set of factors. This Comment will propose the factors
that courts should be required to consider, based on the original factors outlined in the Kent deci-
sion but revised to reflect recent jurisprudence, legislative trends, and understanding of adolescent
development, and biology.
Transfer Statute, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2004).
6 See infra Appendix A.
There are several different methods of mandatory transfer: mandatory waiver, statutory exclusion, direct file,
and once an adult, always an adult provision. For the purpose of this comment, "mandatory transfer" includes all of
these methods.
Clyde Haberman, WhenYouth Violence Spurred 'Superpredator'Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015).
' 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
10 Id. at 556.
" See infra Appendix B.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Washington College of Law 27Fall 2017
3
Woods: We "Kent" Keep Transferring Kids Without a Hearing: Using Recent
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
Criminal Law Practitioner
I. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose and Evolution
of the Juvenile System
During the nineteenth century, the treat-
ment of juveniles in the United States started
to change as social reformers began to create
special facilities for "troubled juveniles."' 3 The
first juvenile court was established in Illinois
in 1899, seeking to further create a separate
system for juvenile offenders that insulated
children from the adult criminal system and
focused on age-appropriate treatment. 4 One
of the first judges on this court, Judge Julian
Mack, believed that "the child who must be
brought into court should, of course, be made
to know that he is face to face with the power
of the state, but he should at the same time,
and more emphatically, be made to feel that he
is the object of its care and solicitude." 5 This
idea of special treatment for children caught
on and within twenty-five years most states had
their own separate juvenile systems.' 6 These
early courts were focused on rehabilitation,
not punishment, and emphasized informal and
nonadversarial approaches to cases which were
civil actions, based on the doctrine parens pa-
triae, which gave the state the power to serve as
1 ABA Div. for Pub. Educ., The Histoy ofJuvende
Justice (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpartl.authcheck-
dam.pdf.
14 See Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the
Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in
Juvenile Justice, 35 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1998).
For example, to protect children from the stigma of
adult prosecutions, juveniles were not charged, instead
a petition was filed; juveniles were not called "defen-
dants," instead they were called "respondents;" juveniles
were not found guilty, instead they were adjudicated
delinquent; and juveniles were not sentenced, instead
they were committed. Id.
" Julian W Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARVARD L.
REV. 104 (1909).
16 See The History ofJuvende Justice, supra note 13.
the guardian of juveniles.' However, during the
twentieth century, these proceedings became
increasingly punitive as judges steadily began
to impose harsher sentences on children.
The Supreme Court, recognizing this
shift, began to move juvenile courts toward a
more paternalistic structure through a series of
cases that gave juveniles many of the procedur-
al safeguards associated with the adult criminal
justice system.' 9 The peak of this "due process
era" ofjuvenilejustice was the Supreme Court's
decision In re Gault,2 0 where it held that juve-
niles had the right to counsel during delinquen-
cy proceedings in order to protect against mis-
use of judicial authority.] The Court expressed
concerns that the juvenile courts were not liv-
ing up to their promise of a focus on treatment
and rehabilitation, either because of misplaced
judicial discretion or lack of resources. 22  a ju-
" Id. During this time period, cases were treated as
civil actions and courts could even order juveniles to be
removed from their homes in order to learn how to be a
responsible, law-abiding young adult.
a See The Histor ofJuvenile Justice, supra note 16.
1 Ralph A. Weisheit, Philosophy and the Demise of
ParensPatriae, 52 FED. PROBATION 56 (1988) ("Paternal-
ism implies no firm commitment to rehabilitation but
suggests a general attitude of protectiveness from which
either gentle or harsh treatment might be justified.")
20 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21 Id. at 18 (noting "that unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute
for principle and procedure"). However, some academ-
ics have suggested that juvenile defendants have fared
worse in the post-Gault era. See Franklin E. Zimring &
David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for Con-
temporary Reforms, in Choosing the Future forAmerican
Juvenile Justice, at 216, 231 32 (describing the con-
trast between an early juvenile court where the judge
had tremendous power and discretion and the post-
Gault expansion of prosecutorial power at the expense
of judicial and probation authority).
22 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13 (finding that a judge
abused his discretion and had too much unfettered
power when he sentenced a fifteen-year-old boy to
a reform school until he was twenty-one for a prank
phone call); See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
556 (1966) (noting that because some courts lack the re-
28 Washington College of Law Fall 2017
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venile's loss of liberty during confinement in a
juvenile training school would be comparable
to the punishment of imprisonment faced by
adults, the Court felt that they were entitled to
at least some due process protections in juve-
nile hearings to ensure fairness.2 3 While rec-
ognizing that the state has a responsibility to
help children in jeopardy, the Court noted that
"good intentions [of judges] do not themselves
obviate the need for criminal due process safe-
guards in juvenile courts."24
The juvenile justice system underwent a
rapid shift, however, in the 1990s with the rise
of the myth of the juvenile "superpredator." 2 5
Even though these sensationalized claims of
criminologists turned out to be false,26 politi-
cians seized on this idea and campaigned for
sources to perform in aparenspatriae capacity and "that
there may be grounds for concern that the child re-
ceives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children").
23 Based on this understanding, the Court also extend-
ed several other rights to juveniles under due process.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967) (notice of the
charges against them, the right against self-incrimina-
tion, and the right to confront witnesses); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (raising the standard of proof from
"preponderance of the evidence" to "beyond a reason-
able doubt").But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (declining to extend the due process rights of
a trial by jury to juvenile court proceedings).
24 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365.
2' This term was coined by John Delulio, then a Princ-
eton professor, who wrote that "America is now home to
thickening ranks of juvenile 'superpredators' radically
impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including
ever more preteenage boys, who murder, assault, rape,
rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs
and create serious communal disorders." Elizabeth
Becker, As Ex- Theorist on Young 'Superpredators,'Bush
Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001).
26 See Kevin Drum, The New York Times Fails to Explain
Why "Super Predators" Turned Out to be a Myth, MOTH -
ER JONES (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/
kevin-drum/2014/04/new-york-times-fails -explain-why-
super-predators -turned -out-be -myth (outlining how
juvenile crime and specifically violent crime, actually
decreased in the United States following this era).
harsher treatment of juvenile offenders. 27 As a
result of this trend, laws shifted to expose chil-
dren to even harsher procedures and punish-
ments. 28 By the beginning of the twenty-first
century, the United States was an international
outlier in its harsh treatment of juvenile defen-
dants-until 2005, the United States was the
only developed country that subjected children
to the death penalty.2 9
However, even before the rise of the "su-
perpredator" myth, general tough-on-crime
approaches had begun to make it easier for
children to be removed from the protections
of the juvenile system and transferred to adult
criminal court.0 Prior to the 1970s, juvenile
21 See John Kelly, Juvenile Transfers to Adult Court:
A Lingering Outcome ofthe Super-Predator Craze, THE
CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL CHANGE (Sept. 28, 2016), https://
chronicleofsocialchange.org/juvenile-justice-2/juve-
nile-transfers- adult- court-lingering-outcome-super-pre-
dator-craze/21635 (highlighting then-First Lady Hillary
Clinton's statements about kids called "super-predators,
saying that "[these kinds of kids have] no conscience, no
empathy, we can talk about why they ended up that way,
but first we have to bring them to heel."
2' As reported in the New York Times, politicians
believed that crime would continue to increase and
continued to foster an environment that demonized
youth. Some experts claimed that we would soon see
"radically impulsive, brutally remorseless" kids, many
"who pack guns instead of lunches" and "have abso-
lutely no respect for human life." See Haberman, supra
note 8. For more information, see generally Frank-
lin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence: A Cautionary
Tale, in Choosing the Future for American Juvenile
Justice (2014).
29 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) ("Our de-
termination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation
in the stark reality that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to give official sanc-
tion to the juvenile death penalty."). See also Brief for
the Juvenile Law Center et. al. as Amicus Curiae, Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3o See Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 1787, 1790-95 (2016) (discussing how a parallel
trend of transfer statutes and the trend toward deter-
minate sentencing schemes were the "perfect storm" to
create extreme and mandatory sentences for youth).
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transfer to adult court was not common -it was
the exception. However, in the 1970s, even be-
fore the "superpredator" phenomenon, states
changed their laws in a number of significant
ways that make it easier for children to be
tried as adults.3 ' These changes ranged from
lowering the age at which a judge was autho-
rized to allow a transfer to the imposition of
statutory exclusion laws that automatically ex-
cluded children from adult court, to laws that
gave prosecutors more control over where they
decided to initially file the charges. 32 This get-
tough on crime legislation that continued into
the 1990s may have been an attempt "to push
the allocation of power in juvenile courts closer
to the model of prosecutorial domination that
has been characteristic of criminal courts in
the United States for a generation."
B. Kent v. United States
While the current state of juvenile trans-
fer laws are slowly and methodically moving
away from an approach that over-criminalizes
juvenile offenders and towards treating juve-
niles as children instead of sentencing them as
adults, that discussion actually began fifty years
ago with a child named Morris A. Kent, Jr. in
1961.3' This case, Kent c. United States, remains
the only case that the Supreme Court has
heard on the issue of juvenile transfer. The
defendant was sixteen years old, already on
probation, and was arrested for housebreaking,
rape, and robbery.36 Anticipating that he would
be transferred to adult court by the District
of Columbia, Kent's attorney filed a motion
requesting a hearing on the issue of jurisdic-
' Aaron Kupchik, Judging Juveniles: ProsecutingAdoles-
cents in Adult and Juvenile Courts, (2006).
32 Id.
3 See Zimring, supra note 27.
3 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
3 Id.
36 Id.
tion.3 He also ordered a psychological evalu-
ation to be conducted, which indicated that
Kent suffered from a mental illness. 38 The juve-
nile judge did not rule on this motion, but in-
stead filed an order waiving jurisdiction after a
full investigation." 3 9 However, the judge failed
to describe the investigation or the grounds for
the waiver. 40Kent's lawyer moved to dismiss the
criminal indictment, arguing that the juvenile
court's waiver had been invalid.4 ' His motion
was overruled and Kent was found guilty on
six counts of housebreaking and robbery. He
was sentenced to thirty to ninety years in pris-
on. 42 His conviction was appealed up to the Su-
preme Court, which ruled the juvenile waiver
of jurisdiction was invalid.
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas
stated that "the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections ac-
corded to adults nor the solicitous care and re-
generative treatment postulated for children."
Under the statute that granted original juris-
diction to the juvenile court, Kent was entitled
to a presumption of treatment as a juvenile. To
overcome that, a child is entitled to a hearing,
which must "satisfy the basic requirements of
due process and fairness."45 The court listed
several specific factors that must be considered
to satisfy this requirement.
3 Id.
3' Laurie Sansbury, The 50thAnniversary ofKent: The
Decision that Sparked the Transformation ofJuvenile De-
fense, NAT'L Assoc. FOR PUB. DEE (March 21, 2016), http:/
www-old.publicdefenders.us/?q-node/1026.
3 Kent, 383 U.S. at 541.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 553.
4 Id.
" Id.
4 Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
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The determinative factors are the
following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged of-
fense to the community and whether
the protection of the community re-
quires waiver;
2. Whether the alleged offense was
committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner;
3. Whether the alleged offense was
against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offens-
es against persons especially if per-
sonal injury resulted;
4. The prosecutive merit of the com-
plaint, i.e., whether there is evidence
upon which a Grand Jury may be ex-
pected to return an indictment (to be
determined by consultation with the
[prosecuting attorney]);
5. The desirability of trial and dispo-
sition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile's associates
in the alleged offense are adults who
will be charged with a crime in [crim-
inal court];
6. The sophistication and maturity of
the juvenile as determined by con-
sideration of his home, environmen-
tal situation, emotional attitude, and
pattern of living;
7. The record and previous history of
the juvenile, including previous con-
tacts with [social service agencies],
other law enforcement agencies, ju-
venile courts and other jurisdictions,
prior periods of probation to [the
court], or prior commitments to ju-
venile institutions;
8. The prospects for adequate protec-
tion of the public and the likelihood
of reasonable rehabilitation of the
juvenile (if he is found to have com-
mitted the alleged offense) by the use
of procedures, services and facilities
currently available to the Juvenile
Court. 6
These principles still resonate fifty years
later with even greater weight considering psy-
chological developments and subsequent juve-
nile justice jurisprudence. While Kent did not
make any judgments about whether or not waiv-
er is constitutional, the case "forcefully estab-
lishes that children facing trial as adults need
procedural protections- effective counsel, ac-
cess to and the ability to challenge court docu-
ments, and findings as to why waiver is proper."
In subsequent cases, courts declined
to follow Kent by finding that the protections
were limited to judicial waiver laws and did not
apply to statutory exclusion or direct file stat-
utes.48 Transfer laws remain largely out of the
reach of courts and most courts have been def-
erential to the decisions of legislatures. 49 Ad-
ditionally, because the Court in Kent detailed
that an offense falling within the statutory lim-
itations will be waived if "it is heinous or of an
aggravated character or if it represents a pat-
tern of repeated offenses which indicate that
46 Id.
4 Laurie Sansbury, supra note 38.
41 See e.g. State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 656 (Conn.
1998) (holding that absence of a pre-waiver hearing did
not violate any of the defendants' constitutional rights
when defendant was transferred under a statutory ex-
clusion provision). In Angel C., the court further noted
that there was no inherent or constitutional right to
the special treatment of a juvenile, and that any special
treatment afforded juveniles by the legislature could be
reasonably withdrawn or limited. Id. at 660.
4 See Jeremy D. Ball et. al.,Predicting Public Opinion
About Juenile Waivers, 19 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY LE-
VIEw 2 85 (2008).
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the juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation," all
jurisdictions read this to mean that waiver laws
for violent offenses did not have to adhere to
the standards in Kent.s0
C. Supreme Court Juvenile Justice
Jurisprudence
Prior to the landmark Roper c. Simmons51
decision in 2005, the Supreme Court had not-
ed the important pertinence of youth in sev-
eral cases. In Johnson c. Texas 5 2 the Court in-
sisted that sentences consider the "mitigating
qualities of youth."5 ' The Court also observed
that "youth is more than a chronological fact"54
and is instead a time of immaturity, irresponsi-
bly, impetuousness, and recklessness. 5 In Ed-
dings c. Oklahoma'5 6 a sixteen-year-old shot and
killed a police officer .5 The Supreme Court in-
validated his death sentence because the judge
did not consider evidence of his background of
neglect and family violence.58 The Court found
that this evidence was "particularly relevant"-
more so than it would have been in the case of
an adult offender.59 The Court specifically not-
ed that youth is a moment and "condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage, "o and
just as the chronological age of a minor is it-
self a relevant mitigating factor of great weight,
so must the background and mental and emo-
tional development of a youthful defendant be
duly considered" in assessing his culpability.6'
o Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
12 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1994).
5 Id.
5 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Johnson, 509 U.S. at 350.
56 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115.
5 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 116.
These cases, however, did not establish
any significant reform, but they did build up
to a landmark shift in juvenile justice that oc-
curred with the Supreme Court's decisions in
Roper c. Simmons, Graham c. Florida, and Miller
(. Alabama.6 2 The Supreme Court, through this
series of cases, has recognized that children are
constitutionally and fundamentally different
than adults and are more capable of change
than adults accused of the same crimes.
1. Roper Y. Simmons
The Supreme Court's shift in percep-
tion of juvenile offenders was most significant-
ly marked by its decision in Roper Y. Simmons,
where it held that sentencing individuals to
death for crimes committed before the age of
eighteen was unconstitutional. 63 In Roper, a
seventeen -year- old was convicted of burglary,
kidnapping, and first-degree murder while he
was still a junior in high school.6 ' Based on his
age at the time, Simmons was outside of the
62 This groundbreaking reform also included JD.B. c.
North Carolina, which expanded the concept of special
protection for kids beyond the Eighth Amendment
when the Court held that a juvenile's age is a proper
consideration in the Miranda custody analysis. 564 U.S.
261 (2011).
For a discussion of whether the Supreme Court can
actually generate social change or whether it merely
responds to social change that has already occurred, see
generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, "The Hollow Hope: Can
Courts Bring about Social Change?" (2d ed. 2008) (ques-
tioning whether the Supreme Court can bring about
meaningful social change); Brian K. Landsberg, "En-
forcing Desegregation: A Case Study of Federal Dis-
trict Court Power and Social Change in Macon County
Alabama", 48 LAW & Soc'v REV. 867 (2014) (stating that
despite judicial constraints, it is possible for courts to
generate social reform); Mark Tushnet, "Some Legacies
of Brown v. Board of Education", 90 VA. L. REV. 1693
(2004) (suggesting that the Court can articulate powerful
principles of social reform despite constraints imposed
on the judicial branch).
63 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
"6 Id. at 555. In this case Simmons, along with a friend,
entered the home of the victim, kidnapped her, and
then drowned her in a river.
32 Washington College of Law Fall 2017
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juvenile jurisdiction of Missouri and charged
initially in adult court.5 During closing argu-
ments, both the prosecutor and defense coun-
sel addressed Simmons' age - the defense de-
scribed it as a mitigating factor, to which the
state responded "Age he says. Think about age.
Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't
that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I
submit. Quite the contrary." 66 The defense also
put on experts and evidence of Simmons's trou-
bled background, but he was still sentenced to
the death penalty by the jury.67
The Supreme Court reversed and its
holding was based on a longstanding ques-
tion applied to capital crimes: if juveniles are
examined as a group, is the use of the death
penalty proportionate under Eighth Amend-
ment given their diminished capacity?6' To an-
swer this question of proportionality, the Court
looked at the "objective indicia of consensus,
as expressed in particular by the enactments
of legislatures that have addressed the ques-
tion" and then exercised its own "independent
judgment" as to "whether the death penalty is
a disproportionate punishment for juveniles." 6 9
The Court held that under this criteria, the
Eighth Amendment forbade the death penalty
for juveniles based on the following findings:
(1) evolving standards of decency and moral
conceptions of juveniles disallowed for capi-
tal punishment in the majority of states; (2) it
was rarely executed in states that permitted it;
66 See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 211.021 (2000).
66 Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
67 Id. The defense put on evidence that Simmons was
very immature," "very impulsive," and "very susceptible
to being manipulated or influenced." Testimony includ-
ed information about a difficult home environment,
dramatic changes in behavior, drug abuse, and poor
performance in school.
68 Id. at 564.
69 Id.
(3) and that national trends were moving away
from the use of the practice for juveniles."o
The Court did not end its analysis with
the Eighth Amendment violation, however, and
rendered its own judgement about states exe-
cuting children. " Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, noted that based on recent social
and neuroscience research, there were three
general reasons why juveniles were categorical-
ly different than adults in terms of capital pun-
ishment.7 2 These characteristics were: (1) juve-
niles lack maturity and have an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility, resulting in impulsive
decision-making; (2) juveniles are more suscep-
tible to negative influences and outside pres-
sures; and (3) a juvenile's character is not as well
formed as an adults and therefore juveniles have
more of a possibility of rehabilitation.
2. Graham v. Florida
Five years after Roper, the Court took up
the question of proportionate juvenile punish-
ment again in Graham v. Florida. In Graham,
a sixteen-year-old was arrested for an attempt-
ed robbery. 5 Under Florida statute, a prosecu-
tor may elect to charge sixteen-year-olds and
seventeen-year-olds as adults for most felo-
ny crimes. 6 Graham was charged as an adult
and, under a plea deal, sentenced to probation
and withheld adjudication of guilt." However,
when he subsequently violated the terms of
his parole and was accused of another armed
robbery, the trial court found him guilty of the
o Id. at 567 68.
Id. at 563.
72 Id.
7 Id.
7 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
7 Id. at 53.
76 See FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b).
7 Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
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earlier armed burglary and other charges and
sentenced him to life without parole."
Building on Roper, the Court found that
Graham's sentence was unconstitutional as it
was in violation of the Eighth Amendment and
held that a life without parole sentence was
constitutional for a juvenile offender accused
of a crime other than homicide.79 Once again,
the Court found that categorically this punish-
ment was unconstitutional for juvenile offend-
ers.so Like Roper, the Court found the punish-
ment here was not proportional to the crime,
given a juvenile's diminished moral culpability
and greater capacity for reform." Justice Ken-
nedy, for the majority, began his analysis by
stating that the Eighth Amendment bars both
"barbaric" punishments and punishments that
are disproportionate to the crime committed.8 2
Within the latter category, the Court explained
that its cases fell into one of two classifications:
(1) cases challenging the length of term-of-
years sentences given all the circumstances in
a particular case and (2) cases where the Court
has considered categorical restrictions on the
death penalty. 3 Because Graham's case chal-
lenged "a particular type of sentence" and its
application "to an entire class of offenders who
have committed a range of crimes," the Court
found the categorical approach appropriate
and relied upon its recent death penalty case
law for guidance.'
The Court also focused on the non-homi-
cide aspect of the case, and that historically, ho-
" Id. at 57. Because Florida had abolished its parole
system, a life sentence meant that Graham and other
defendants had no possibility of release unless granted
executive clemency. See FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e).
* Graham, 560 U.S. at 52-53.
8o Id. at 79.
8 Id. at 68 69.
82 Id. at 59.
1 Id. at 59-61.
" Id. at 61-62.
micide is treated significantly different than oth-
er crimes, even though the Court would reject
this argument in Miller8 5 After Graham, a child
could only receive a sentence of life-without-pa-
role for murder. However, based on mandatory
waiver statutes, this sentence could be imposed
on a child without weighing his or her maturity,
culpability, or potential for rehabilitation. 6
3. Miller c. Alabama
The Court did not take long to take up
the question of homicide offenses-two years
later, the Court took up the question in Miller
(. Alabama."' The Miller case involved two ju-
veniles who were transferred to adult court
through state transfer laws in Arkansas and Ala-
bama. Kuntrell Jackson, then fourteen years old,
was charged with capital felony murder and ag-
gravated robbery." As discussed below, Arkansas
law gives prosecutors the discretion to charge
fourteen-year-olds as adults through direct file
when they are alleged to have committed cer-
tain offenses, including capital felony murder.8 9
Jackson moved to transfer the case to juvenile
court, but the court denied the motion based
on the alleged facts of the time, a psychiatrist's
examination, and his juvenile arrest history.90 A
8 Id.
6 Matt Ford, A Retroactive BreakforJuenile Offenders,
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2016/01/montgomery-alabama-su-
preme-court/426897/.
8 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
8 See Jackson v. State, 194 S.W 3d 757 (Ark. 2004). The
facts of the incident, which occurred on November 18,
1999, are as follows. Kuntrell Jackson, a fourteen-year-
old, was with his older friends who decided to rob a
video store. Jackson remained outside while his two
friends went in. One friend pointed a gun at the clerk
and demanded money. Jackson entered the store as the
victim threatened to call the police and his friend shot
her in the face. All three boys fled the scene and the
victim died of her injuries.
8 See ARK. CODEANN. §9-27-318(c)(2).
o See Jackson v. State, 194 S.W 3d 757 (Ark. 2004);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-318(d), (e).
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jury convicted Jackson on both counts, and the
judge was only able to impose one verdict due
to mandatory minimums: life without parole.91
Similarly, fourteen-year-old Evan Miller was
also tried and convicted as an adult for murder
in the court of arson - a crime that, like capital
felony murder in Arkansas, carries a mandatory
minimum punishment of life without parole.92
In Miller's case, Alabama law required that he
initially be charged as a juvenile, but allowed for
transfer through judicial waiver on the motion
of the prosecutor.93 The juvenile court agreed
to the transfer after a hearing, citing the nature
of the crime, Miller's "mental maturity," and his
prior juvenile offenses of truancy and "criminal
mischief."94
In a 5-4 decision, the Court found sen-
tencing schemes that prescribe mandatory life
without parole for juveniles to be unconstitu-
tional, regardless of the crime they are accused
of.95 Citing its decisions in Roper and Graham, it
held that imposing mandatory life-without-pa-
role sentences on children "contravenes Gra-
ham's (and also Roper's) foundational principle:
that imposition of a State's most severe pen-
alties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as
though they were not children"96 This decision
9 Miller v. Alabama, 564 U.S. 460, 467 (2012).
92 See Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. 2010). In Mill-
er's case, then fourteen-year-old Miller and his sixteen-
year-old friend robbed and beat a neighbor to death.
The victim was an adult and Miller's mother's drug
dealer. He brought the boys back to his trailer, where
all three drank and did drugs. The boys tried to rob the
victim, who then became violent and grabbed Miller by
the throat. A physical altercation ensued, and the boys
struck the victim with a bat several times. After, the boys
set fire to the trailer to cover up the evidence and the
victim died of smoke inhalation.
1 Miller, 564 U.S. at 465 (2012). See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-
5-40(9),13A-6-2(c).
" E.J.M. v. State, No. CR 03 0915, pp. 5 7 (Aug. 27,
2004) (unpublished memorandum).
* Miller, 564 U.S. at 465.
96 Id. at 466.
was based on the Court's belief that children
"are constitutionally different from adults for
sentencing purposes. Their lack of maturity and
underdeveloped sense of responsibility lead to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-tak-
ing," therefore acknowledging that regardless of
the crime committed, being a child matters.97
The Court specifically noted how both
juveniles in the companion cases illustrated
the precise problem behind mandatory sen-
tencing schemes. 98 In the first case, Jackson was
charged through felony murder after he went
along with some of his friends who he knew
intended to rob a video store.99 He did not fire
the bullet that killed the victim, nor did the
State even argue that he meant to kill her, only
that he was an accomplice.' 00 He was convicted
solely because he was aware that his accom-
plice had a gun and because when he entered
the store, he told the victim "[w]e ain't play-
in'."`o The Court noted that Jackson's age was
important for his culpability for the offense -
including the calculation of the risk imposed
by his friend having a gun and his willingness
to walk away. 02 Additionally, Jackson's violent
family background and history of neglect was
also relevant to the sentencing decision, yet his
background was not even considered before
the lower court sentenced him to a life in pris-
on.103 In Miller's case, he and a friend killed the
adult victim after he had provided them with
drugs and alcohol.104 The Court noted that "if
97 Id.
9' Id. at 4 67.
" Jackson v. State, 194 S.W. 3d 757, 760 (Ark. 2004).
100 Miller, 564 U.S. at 465.
101 Id.
102 Id.; see also Graham v. United States, 560 U.S. 48,
52 (2010) ("[W] hen compared to an adult murderer, a
juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a
twice diminished moral culpability").
103 Miller, 564 U.S. 470. Both Jackson's mother and his
grandmother had previously shot other individuals.
104 Id.
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ever a pathological background might have
contributed to a 14 year old's commission of a
crime, it is here," referring to a lifetime of phys-
ical abuse and suicidal tendencies.105 Despite
the severe crime with which both juveniles
were charged, the Court once again stated that
youth mattered at sentencing.106
The Supreme Court also noted that
transfer statutes like those at issue in Miller
were not outlierso and that many left no room
for judicial discretion: "Of the 29 relevant juris-
dictions, about half place at least some juvenile
homicide offenders in adult court automatical-
ly, with no apparent opportunity to seek trans-
fer to juvenile court." 08
D. Psychological Frameworks
One of the most significant components
of the Court's reasoning in these three cases
was its acceptance and recognition of the role
of science and adolescent development in sen-
tencing decisions. This is significantly based on
the increase of research and findings that al-
low scientists to understand the human brain
better and how it functions.1 09 Kent was de-
cided during a time when it was assumed that
"' Miller had been in and out of foster care his entire
life because his mother suffered from alcoholism and
drug-addiction, his stepfather abused him, and he had
tried to kill himself four times the first time when he
was only six. See E.J.M. v. State, 928 So. 2d 1077, 1081
(Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (Cobb, J., concurring in result).
The Court also noted that, despite such a difficult
background, Miller did not have a significant criminal
history; there were only two instances of truancy and
one instance of second-degree criminal mischief
106 Miller, 564 U.S. at 468.
10' At the time Miller was decided, twenty-eight states
and the Federal Government imposed mandatory life
without parole on some juveniles convicted of murder
in adult court. Id.
108 Id.
1o' For an overview of new technology and discoveries,
see Elkhonon Goldberg, The Executive Brain: Frontal
Lobes and the CivilizedMind (2001).
adolescent development was completed by age
eighteen, but emerging research shows that the
brain- especially the prefrontal cortex, which
controls decision-making, risk management,
and impulse control -does not finish develop-
ing until one's mid-twenties.11 0 Furthermore,
after a certain age, the likelihood of committing
another violent offense dramatically lessens.'
New discoveries have provided scientific
confirmation that adolescent years are a signifi-
cant time of transition and that adolescents have
significant neurological deficiencies that result
in stark limitations of judgement.11 2 For exam-
ple, the frontal lobe, which is responsible for im-
pulse control, judgement, and decision making,
develops slowly until the early twenties."' This
makes adolescents especially prone to risk-tak-
ing." 4 They are also more susceptible to stress,
which further distorts already poor cost-benefit
analysis, and trauma often makes youth hyper-
vigilant in response to threats.115 Normal adoles-
cents cannot be expected to operate with matu-
rity, judgment, risk aversion, or impulse control
of an adult - especially teens who have suffered
brain trauma, dysfunctional family, abuse, or vi-
olence.1 6 Additionally, most adolescent delin-
quent behavior occurs on a social stage where
immediate pressure of peers is the main moti-
vation."' When a child is transferred to adult
110 Young Adult Development Project, Brain Changes,
http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html.
"1 Nat'l Institute of Justice, "From Juvenile Delinquen-
cy to Young Adult Offending", https://www.nij.gov/top-
ics/crime/Pages/delinquency-to -adult- offending.aspx.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Francine Sherman, Juvenile Justice: Advancing Re-
search, Policy, andPractice (2011).
"1 Id.
116 Chris Mallet, Socio-HistoricalAnalysis ofJuvenile
Offenders on Death Row, 3 Juv. CORR. MENTAL HEALTH RE-
PORT 65 (2003).
11' Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent,
Ky. CHILDREN 'S RIGHTS J., 1999. Dr. Beyer, a child welfare
and juvenile justice consultant, has created a framework
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court, none of these important scientific factors
are taken in to consideration, as a child is being
evaluated as if they were an adult.
E. Impact and Consequences of Juveniles
Tried in Adult Court
There are various detrimental immediate
and long term effects on juveniles who are trans-
ferred to adult court. Transferred children are
exposed to longer and harsher sentences than if
they remained in the juvenile system, and these
punishments are often mandatory sentences."8
Most states permit or require that youth charged
as adults be placed in adult institutions as they
are pending trial.11 9 On any given day, nearly
7,500 young people are locked up in adultjails.1 2 0
for juvenile courts to use when assessing children. She
believes that juvenile cases should be seen through
three separate frameworks: immaturity, disability, and
trauma. Id. When looking at the immaturity of juveniles,
she notes that juveniles are susceptible to immature
thinking, which leads to impulsive crimes such as
having a weapon without a plan to use it or talking to
police without a lawyer. Id. They also have immature
identities, which leads them to such things as being
susceptible to peer pressure or wrongly trusting police.
Id. Kids also have immature moral development which
can lead to consequences as committing an act because
they believed they were righting a wrong, not realizing
there would be a victim or refusing to cooperate with
police to get a friend in trouble. Id. She also notes
the prevalence of disabilities among youth, which can
lead to problems such as processing issues, difficulties
understanding Miranda warnings, or problems commu-
nicating. Id. Finally, she suggests that youth should be
viewed through their trauma, which can cause delayed
development, high anxiety, and depression. Id. It can
also lead youth to numb their feelings with substance
abuse. Id.
118 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Trying JuvenilesAs Adults:
An Analysis ofState TransferLaws and Reporting (2011),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/232434.pdf
119 Id.
120 Jailing Juvendes: The Dangers ofIncarcerating Youth
nAdult Jails in America, Campaign forYouth Justice,
(2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Down-
loads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ -Jailing Juveniles
Report 2007-11-15.pdf
The number in adult prison is even higher - on
any given day, approximately 2,700 young peo-
ple are locked up in adult prisons.121 There is a
higher risk of harm for youth in adult facilities
than in juvenile institutions: youth sentenced to
adult facilities are thirty-six times more likely to
commit suicide.12 They are also at the highest
risk for rape and other forms of sexual abuse.1 23
According to a survey by the Department of
Justice, "1.8 percent of 16- and 17- year-olds
imprisoned with adults report being sexually
abused by other inmates," and of these cases, 75
percent of children report being repeatedly vic-
timized by staff.1 24 But, because of the imbalance
of power of children and the adult staff, most
juveniles fail to report their abuse.1 2 5 In addition
to the immediate physical and psychological
consequences of incarceration in adult facilities,
transferred children are also at risk to harmful
disruptions to their development.1 26
Transfer also has a long-term effect on
youth. When they leave jail or prison, they still
carry the stigma of an adult criminal convic-
tion. A felony conviction can make it harder to
find a job, find housing, get a college degree, or
any other means to turn their lives around.1 27
Additionally, transfer policies actually increase
the likelihood that the youth will reoffend and
youth prosecuted as adults are also have a high-
121 Heather C.West, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2009, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf
122 See Jailing Juveniles, supra note 120; See also Ford,
supra note 86.
12' Nat'l Criminal Justice Reference Servs,Nat'lPrison
Rape Elimination Comm'n Report (2009), https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/226680.pdf
124 Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by
Inmates, 2011 12, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf
121 See Ford, supra note 86.
126 Id.
12' After Prison, Roadblocks to Reentry: A Report on State
LegalBarriers Facing People with CriminalfRecords, Legal
Action Ctr. (2004).
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er recidivism rate than youth who remain in
juvenile court.'2 8 A Center for Disease Control
and Prevention Task Force report found that
transferring youth to the adult criminal system
increases violence, causes harm to juveniles,
and threatens public safety.1 2 9
F. Current Methods of Transfer by State
A transfer statute is a "provision that al-
lows or mandates the trial of a juvenile as an
adult in criminal court for a criminal act."' All
states'3 ' currently still have transfer laws that
allow or mandate some youth to be transferred
to adult court, even though their age places
them in the category of juvenile jurisdiction.1 32
Current transfer laws vary considerably in
specificity of statutory language, application, as
well as flexibility and breadth of coverage, but
all states have at least one of the three broad
categories of transfer law: judicial waiver, stat-
utory exclusion, and direct file.' 33 Many states
121 Youth prosecuted as adults are 34% more likely to
recidivate with more violent offenses. See Jailing Juve-
niles, supra note 120.
129 Effects on Violence ofLaws andPolicies Facilitating
the Transfer ofYouth from the Jucenile to the Adult Justice
System: A Report on Recommendations of the Task Force on
Community Preentie Services, Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/
rr5609.pdf
130 Transfer Statute, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014).
131 For the purposes of this comment, the District of
Columbia is counted as a state.
132 See infra Appendix A (summarizing the authors'
findings of each state's codified transfer provisions).
This data was compiled by the author while working
as a law clerk at the National Juvenile Defender Cen-
ter. Unless otherwise indicated, all information in this
section comes from the statutes listed in Appendix A.
For the purpose of this Comment, which seeks to give
a sense of juvenile transfer nationwide, the information
has been placed into generalized categories. Each state
has a different system for transfer with state-specific
nuances; consult each state's statutes for further infor-
mation.
133 See id Several states also have mandatory waiver
provisions, which are not discussed in the scope of this
also have "once an adult, always an adult" pro-
visions, which mean that a child who has been
transferred will permanently be charged as an
adult for all future offenses. 3 4
Thirty-one states specify a minimum
age a child must reach before the child can be
considered for transfer to adult court by any
method of transfer, including judicial waiver,
statutory exclusion, and direct file.'3 5 Twelve
states do not set an age limitation for certain
enumerated offenses, typically violent felo-
nies. 3 6 Eight states have no statutory minimum
age requirement for a child to be tried in adult
comment as its effect is the same as statutory exclusion.
It can be distinguished from statutory exclusion, howev-
er, as under mandatory waiver, proceedings against a
child initiate in juvenile court. However, unlike judicial
waiver, the court has no other role than to determine
that there is probable cause to believe a juvenile of the
requisite age committed an offense falling within the
mandatory waiver law. Once the court has done so, the
juvenile is automatically transferred to adult court.
For more information, see TryingJuvenilesAsAdults:
An Analysis ofState TransferLaws and Reporting, Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S.
Dep't of Justice (2011). Several states also have reverse
waiver statutes, which are also not discussed in the
scope of this comment. Reverse waiver statutes allow a
juvenile who is charged as an adult to petition to have
the case transferred back to juvenile court. For more
information, see Jason Zeidenburg, You'reAn Adult Now:
Youth in Adult CriminalJustice Systems, U.S. DEP'T OF Jus-
TICE NAT'L INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS (2011), http:/cfyj.
org/documents/FRNICYAAN 2012.pdf
134 See infra Appendix A.
1 The following states have specified minimum age
limits: fifteen years old in Connecticut, New Jersey, and
New Mexico; fourteen years old in Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio,
Texas, and Utah; thirteen years old in Georgia, Illinois,
Mississippi, New York, and Wyoming; twelve years old
in Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, and Vermont;
eleven years old in New Hampshire; and ten years old
in Iowa and Wisconsin.
131 States that do not set an age limit for certain enu-
merated offenses: These states are Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland,
Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and Tennessee.
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court, meaning that under the state statute a
child of any age can be tried in adult court. 37
1. Judicial waiVer
Judicial waiver is the most common
transfer mechanism- forty-six states allow
some form of judicial waiver.'13 If the youth
meets statutory age and offense requirements
and the proper motion for transfer is filed, if
required, a court will hold a transfer hearing to
determine if the child should be transferred to
adult court.1 3 9 Prior to the hearing, sixteen states
require that the youth be evaluated to make
findings on the factors the court must consider
as delineated in the statute, if necessary, to be
considered on whether or not the court should
retain jurisdiction over the youth.'40 This in-
cludes evaluations by professionals and by the
youth's probation officer, if applicable. These
findings range from evaluating whether or not
the child has developmental or mental disabil-
ities to school records and evaluations of the
child's living situation and family support.
1 States with no statutory minimum age requirement:
Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Da-
kota, Washington, and West Virginia.
131 See infra Appendix A (listing judicial waiver statutes
by state).
1 See infra Appendix B (outlining the authors' find-
ings of transfer hearing requirements by state). For the
purpose of this Comment, these findings were general-
ized into categories; for specific requirements by state,
consult the state statute.
140 See infra Appendix B.
i. Transfer hearing
States vary as to the party that can motion
for transfer, but the majority of states with jiudi-
cial waiver, thirty-two states, allow the prosecu-
tor to motion for transfer of a youth.' 4 ' Of these
thirty-two states, the prosecutor is the only par-
ty who can motion for transfer in twenty-three
states, two states allow either the prosecutor or
the defense to motion for transfer, four states
hold a hearing on either the motion of the
court or the prosecutor, and three states hold
a hearing on the motion of either party or the
court.1 42 The other fourteen states with judicial
waiver only hold a transfer hearing upon the
motion of the court. 143 In nine states, a transfer
hearing is automatically required regardless of
whether a motion from any party was filed for
any minor accused of certain offenses. 4 4 In five
states, a hearing is not required for minors of a
certain age accused of certain offenses, and the
minor will be automatically transferred to adult
court if a motion is filed by the state.141
Twenty-five states require a finding that
there is probable cause that the child committed
the alleged act before the child can be considered
for transfer.' 6 Typically, the burden of proof that
the juvenile is not amenable to treatment and
that the protection of the community requires
transfer of the juvenile to adult court is on the
state. However, fourteen states have presumptive
waiver provisions where the burden of proof au-
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 The following states have such requirements: Dela-
ware, Connecticut, Mississippi, Ohio, Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana.
1 The following states do not require a hearing for
transfer if a minor is a certain age and accused of an
enumerated offense: Connecticut (15), Delaware (15),
Indiana (16), North Dakota (14), and South Carolina
(16).
141 See infra Appendix B (listing requirements for judi-
cial waiver hearings by state).
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tomatically shifts from the state to the defendant
if the youth is of a certain age, accused of certain
offenses, or has a prior record. 4 1
ii. Factors considered
Every state besides Indiana, South Car-
olina, and Washington has enumerated factors
that a judge is required to consider at the trans-
fer hearing. 4 These factors are specified in
Appendix C but are outlined here. Twenty-one
states require judges to consider all of the enu-
merated factors, twelve states only require the
court to consider some of the factors, and ten
states allow the court to consider other factors
not listed in the statute.1 4 9 With the exception
of Ohio, state statutes do not give an indica-
tion on how these factors should weigh for or
against transfer.'s While seven states only con-
sider the seriousness of the offense and the ju-
venile's prior record when determining waiver
of jurisdiction, the other states require a more
individualized assessment of the youth based
on the following factors.'15
Forty-one states consider the offense
itself.1 52 This factor refers to additional con-
sideration of the offense outside of minimum
offense requirements for the child to be eli-
gible for judicial waiver. These considerations
are composed of the following: (1) seriousness
1 Id. For specific offenses and ages that require the
burden to shift, consult each state's judicial waiver stat-
ute, listed in Appendix A.
141 See infra Appendix C.
149 Id.
1"o Ohio lists what factors the court should consider
in favor of transfer, such as the victim suffered serious
physical harm, connection to gang activity, or the child
was awaiting adjudication at the time of the act. The
statute separately lists what factors the court should
consider against transfer, such as the victim induced the
act, the child was provoked, or the child did not have
reasonable cause to believe harm would occur.
See infra Appendix C.
152 Id.
of the alleged offense; (2) whether the alleged
felony offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated, or willful manner; and
(3) whether the offense was against persons or
property with greater weight to offenses against
persons. Forty states consider the juvenile's pri-
or record; this includes the extent and nature
of the child's prior delinquency record and
response to any prior treatment.'5 3 Thirty-five
states consider the juvenile's mental condition,
which includes the psychological development
and emotional state of the minor, including any
documented mental illness or developmental
issues, and whether or not they receive any
special education services.'5 4 Thirty-four states
consider the protection of the community, or
whether the protection of the community re-
quires isolation of the minor beyond the ca-
pacity of juvenile facilities.'5 5 Thirty-two states
consider whether or not the juvenile can be
rehabilitated within the time frame of the ju-
venile court jurisdiction, utilizing all resources
currently available to the jurisdiction.' 5 6 Twen-
ty-three states consider the child's maturity as
related to the child's age, outside of statutori-
ly imposed limitations.'5 ' Eighteen states con-
sider the juvenile's pattern of living or family
environment, including the effect that familial,
adult, or peer pressure may have had on the
child's alleged actions in question.15 Fourteen
states consider the culpability of the juvenile,
which includes the level of planning and par-
ticipation involved and the circumstances in
which the offense was allegedly committed.1 5 9
Eleven states consider the impact on the vic-
tim, which may include victim testimony at
1S3 Id.
1 See infra Appendix C.
156 Id.
158 Id.
1'See infra Appendix C.
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the hearing.16 0 Nine states consider whether or
not there are co-defendants charged in adult
court, which would make it more convenient
for the juvenile's case to also be charged in
adult court.' 6 ' Six states consider whether or
not the offense was committed in connection
with gang activity.1 62 Finally, six states consider
whether or not the offense specifically involved
a weapon.'6 3
2. Statutory exclusion
Thirty-six states have statutory exclusion
provisions.'6 4 Almost every state that has stat-
utory exclusion also has judicial waiver, with
the exception of Massachusetts, Montana, New
Mexico, and New York. Generally, these states
simply exclude any minor fitting into the speci-
fied age and offense categories as being defined
as a "child" for juvenile court jurisdictional
purposes. A minor who meets the require-
ments is proceeded against as an adult from
the beginning of the proceedings, and there-
fore no transfer hearing is held. In the majori-
ty of states, statutory exclusion only applies to
youth sixteen or older. The youngest age that
qualifies for statutory exclusion is thirteen,'6 5
with the exception of states that do not have a
specified youngest age for murder, as outlined
above. Murder is the most common offense to
qualify for statutory exclusion. Other common
offenses include drug trafficking, arson, sexual
assault, armed robbery, aggravated assault, use
of a fire arm, theft of a motor vehicle, and con-
viction of prior felonies.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See infra Appendix C.
163 Id.
14 See infra Appendix A (listing statutory exclusion
statutes by state).
16' New York allows youth aged thirteen or older to be
transferred through statutory exclusion.
3. Direct file
Eleven states have direct file provisions. 6 6
Typically, these direct file provisions give both
juvenile and criminal courts the jurisdiction to
hear cases involving certain offenses or minors
falling into certain age categories, and it is left
up to the prosecutor to decide where to file the
charges.'6 ' As with other transfer mechanisms,
there is a wide variation among states regarding
the criteria for direct file. Generally, the mini-
mum level of offense necessary to qualify ap-
pears to be lower than statutory exclusion. For
example, in Arkansas, a minor can be consid-
ered for direct file for a large number of offenses
that do not qualify for statutory exclusion, such
as soliciting a minor to join a street gang. Or, in
Florida, misdemeanors can be filed by the pros-
ecutor in criminal court if the minor involved is
at least sixteen and has a sufficiently serious pri-
or record. Nebraska is the only state with direct
file as the only method of transferring youth to
criminal court and the prosecutor must consid-
er a series of factors similar to those considered
in judicial waiver before filing charges against
a minor in adult court.'6 ' However, there is no
system of accountability for the prosecutor that
'66 See infra Appendix A (listing direct file provisions by
state).
"6' For a discussion of the issues with direct file in a
state specific context in Colorado, see Natasha Gardner,
Direct Fail, 5280 (Dec. 2011), http://www.5280.com/maga-
zine/2011/12/direct-fail?page-full. The Southern Poverty
Law Center has also published a report on the extent
of mistreatment that direct file has generated in New
Orleans. See More Harm Than Good: How Children Are
Unjustly Tried in New Orleans, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (2016),
https://www.splcenter.org/20160217/more-harm-good-
how-children-are-unjustly-tried-adults-new-orleans.
'68 These factors are the type of treatment the minor
would be amenable to, if the offense was violent, mo-
tivation for offense, age of juvenile and age of others
involved in the offense, best interests of the juvenile,
public safety, if the juvenile has the ability to appreciate
the nature and seriousness of the offense, if the victim
agrees to participate in the proceedings, and if the mi-
nor was involved in a gang.
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requires them to make a showing that all the
factors have been considered. Of all of the trans-
fer methods, direct file has come under the most
scrutiny in recent years.1 6 9
4. Once an adult, always an adult
Twenty-nine states have "once an adult,
always an adult" provisions, which require any
minor who has been previously charged as an
adult to continue to be charged as an adult for
all future offenses, regardless of whether the
youth would have been eligible for transfer
for the present offense. 70 Most states with this
provision simply require criminal prosecution
of all subsequent offenses, either by a blanket
exclusion or an automatic waiver, without con-
sideration of any mitigating factors pertaining
to the child's development."' Although sup-
port for transfers is largely predicated on send-
ing violent career offenders to adult court, in
reality more than half of transfers affect juve-
niles who have committed nonviolent proper-
ty, drug, or public order offenses through this
mechanism.172
G. National Trends Regarding
Juvenile Transfer
While every state has a transfer mech-
anism, there is a significant trend throughout
the country towards a preference to keep chil-
dren in juvenile court. Several states have elim-
169 See Jean Trounstine, Trial by Fire: Prosecutors Sending
Juveniles to Adult Courts, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 29, 2016), http:/
www.truth-out.org/news/item/35017-trial-by-fire-prose-
cutors -sending-juveniles -to -adult-courts.
170 See infra Appendix A (listing transfer provisions by
state).
"' Trying Juveniles As Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer
Laws and Reporting, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2011).
172 See generally G. Larry Mays & Rick Ruddell, Do the
Crime Do the Time: Juvenile Criminals andAdult Justice in
the American Court System (2012).
inated mandatory transfer provisions. Missouri
recently changed its "once an adult, always an
adult" provisions to allow a young person to
return to the juvenile system if he or she was
found "not guilty" in adult court."' Utah has
also passed significant reforms, limiting the
number of felonies that can be transferred to
adult court from sixteen to ten and allowing
the judge, not the prosecutor, to exercise judg-
ment on transfer based on the interests of the
minor.7 4 Texas legislators also recently passed
laws that give youth the right to an immediate
appeal if they are transferred to adult court. 7 5
Previously, youth could not appeal their trans-
fer to adult court after they had been convict-
ed or deferred. 76 This new legislation restores
the right to an immediate appeal and mandates
that the Supreme Court take up standards to
accelerate the disposition of these appeals.'
In 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court struck down
mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles
as unconstitutional, stating that ""[t]here is no
other area of the law in which our laws write off
children based only on a category of conduct
without considering all background facts and
circumstances."'78
Several states have also enacted laws
that increase the minimum age that youth can
be transferred. In 2015, Illinois eliminated the
automatic transfer of youth under the age of
sixteen.1 79 In 2015, New Jersey passed legisla-
tion that increased the minimum age at which
a youth can be tried as an adult from fourteen
"' S. 36, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
114 S. 167, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Utah 2015).
"' S.B., 2015 Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
176 
.
177 Id
17' State v. Lyle, 854 N.W 2d 378, 401 (Iowa 2014). The
Iowa Supreme Court noted that the for the Supreme
Court in Miller, the "heart of the constitutional infir-
mity" was that the punishment was mandatory, not the
length of the sentence.
179 H.B. 3718, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015).
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to fifteen.8 o It also makes it more difficult to
initiate transfer of youth, as prosecutors must
submit a written analysis on the reasons for
transfer, which is then only granted at the dis-
cretion of the judge.'8 ' Additionally, the New
Jersey Supreme Court recently held in State in
the Interest ofN.H., that youth threatened with
adult prosecution have the right to full discov-
ery at the waiver stage of juvenile proceedings,
which helps defense counsel make a more
complete argument at a transfer hearing.8 2 In
its decision, the court noted that waiver of a ju-
venile to adult court is the "single most serious
act that the court can perform."
There is also a slow shift nationally to-
wards enacting judicial waiver laws that take into
account the arguments made in Roper, Graham,
and Miller. In Texas, the Criminal Court of Ap-
peals ruled that a court must make an individ-
ualized assessment of youth before transferring
him to adult court, regardless of the offense.8 4
In 2014, California and Maryland enacted laws
that require juvenile court judges to take into
account factors such as age, physical and men-
tal health, and the possibility of rehabilitation,
when considering transfer.1 5 Additionally, Cal-
ifornia legislation updated their criteria to con-
sider the factors required by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Miller Q. Alabama.8 6 In Illinois, new leg-
islation requires juvenile judges to review trans-
fers to determine the proper court for the child,
taking in to account the child's age, background,
and individual circumstances.'8 7
.so S. 2003, 2014 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2015);
181 Id.
182 State in the Interest of N.H., 441 N.J. Super. 347
(2015).
183 j1 .
114 Moon v. State, 451 S.W3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
18 S. 382, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); H.B. 618, 2014
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014).
" S. 382, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
17 H.B. 3718, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015).
Oregon is one of the first states to have
a decision reflecting the importance of evalu-
ating children for transfer in the context of ad-
olescent development.' 8 In Oregon, statutory
law gives the juvenile court the discretion to
waive jurisdiction and transfer a youth to adult
court if it finds the youth to be of "sufficient
sophistication and maturity to appreciate the
nature and quality of the conduct involved." 8 9
In the case of In the Matter of.JCN.-V the Su-
preme Court of Oregon reversed a decision to
transfer a youth under this criteria, holding
that the legislature did not intend for a child's
"sophistication and maturity" to be evaluated
by the same standards as adults.1 90 Instead, the
court must "take measure of a youth and reach
an overall determination as to whether the
youth's capacities are, on the whole, sufficiently
adult-like to justify a conclusion that the youth
was capable of appreciating, on an intellectual
and emotional level, the significance and con-
sequences of his conduct."191
Finally, and most significantly, the Ohio
Supreme Court recently ruled that the man-
datory transfer of juveniles violates juveniles'
right to due process as guaranteed by the Ohio
Constitution.1 9 2 In this case, the prosecutor
filed a motion to transfer a sixteen-year-old to
be tried as an adult based on Ohio statute.1 9 3
After conducting a hearing, the juvenile court
found probable cause and the case was conse-
quently transferred. In ruling that the transfer
was unconstitutional, the court stated that that:
1 In the Matter of J.C.N.-V, 359 Or. 559 (2016).
1 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 4 19c.34 0, 4 19c.3 4 9, 4 19c.352,
4 19c.355.
190 In the Matter ofJ C.N -V, 359 Or. at 559.
191 Id
1'2 Ohio v.Aalim, No. 2015-0677, 2016WL 7449237, *1
(Ohio, Dec. 22, 2016); See Carol Taylor, Mandatory Trans-
fer ofJuveniles to Adult Courts is Unconstitutional, COURT
NEWS OHIO (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.courtnewsohio.
gov/cases/2016/SCO/1222/150677.asp#.WKy36xlrKmk.
193 Id.
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The legislative decision to create a juve-
nile court system, along with our cases address-
ing due-process protections for juveniles, have
made clear that Ohio juveniles have been giv-
en a special status. This special status accords
with recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions indicating that even when they are tried
as adults, juveniles receive special consider-
ation.19 4
The court maintained however, that the
"discretionary-transfer process satisfies funda-
mental fairness under the Ohio Constitution."1 9 5
It. ANALYSIS
A. The Rationale Behind the
Roper, Graham, and Miller Decisions,
in Combination with the Kent Decision,
Should be Applied to Juvenile Transfer
Mandatory transfer statutes do not allow
judicial discretion and prohibit individual con-
sideration of the youth or the circumstances
surrounding the offense. This mandatory con-
sequence is what was at the core of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions, and in light of further
recognition about the importance of youth in
criminal matters, the Kent decision should be
revaluated based on the holdings in Roper, Gra-
ham, andMiller.196 Fifty years ago, the Kent Court
concluded that a transfer to adult court could
be considered invalid because for some kids
accused of certain crimes, having a meaningful
chance for their youth mattered in the transfer
consideration.1 97 However, this holding had its
limitations-the Court in Kent specifically not-
ed that a juvenile was not entitled to a hearing
114 Ohio v.Aalim, No. 2015-0677, 2016WL 7449237, at
*5 (Ohio, Dec. 22, 2016).
195 Id.
19' See Laurie Sansbury, supra note 38.
1 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
if accused of committing an offense that was of
"heinous or aggravated character."1 98 Further-
more, most states currently allow juveniles to
be transferred for non-violent offenses, often
without a hearing.199 Yet, the recent Supreme
Court decisions together represent several im-
portant propositions that should be applicable
to mandatory transfer laws, if taken in combi-
nation with Kent: (1) given all that is known in
terms of adolescent development, biology, and
scientific evidence, children are "categorically
less culpable" than adults for their conduct; (2)
youth is a relevant feature in procedure and
sentencing decisions; (3) mandatory sentences
fail to appropriately account for factors such as
age, maturity, environment, susceptibility, and
rehabilitative potential; (4) life without parole
and other extreme sentences function like a
death sentence when it comes to their applica-
tion to children because children cannot view
the future in the same way as adults do; and (5)
children should be given "meaningful" oppor-
tunities to earn their release based on demon-
strated maturity and rehabilitation.200
The juveniles whose cases were brought
before the Supreme Court in Roper, Graham,
and Miller, all ended up in adult court through
1 Id. at 556.
1 For example, of the approximately four thousand
youth committed to State adult prisons in 1999, 23%
were convicted of property offenses, 9% for drug offens-
es, and 5% for public order offenses. Snyder, H.N., and
Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006National
Report, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2006), https://www.ojjdp.
gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf
200 Miller, 567 U.S. at 461; Graham v. United States, 560
U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (noting that the same characteristics
that render juveniles less culpable than adults their
immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity make them
less likely to consider potential punishment); Roper, 543
U.S. at 571 ("the case for retribution is not as strong
with a minor as with an adult"); Kent, 383 U.S. at 556
(holding that "it is clear beyond dispute that the waiver
of jurisdiction is a 'critically important' action deter-
mining vitally important statutory rights of the juve-
nile").
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the transfer system.20' The various state laws in
each case made it easy for a child to be tried in
adult court, where the juveniles were then ex-
posed to mandatory minimum sentences of the
death penalty and life without parole.
1. Death is not different.
The Kent decision indicated that while
children have a right to a hearing, the most
heinous offenses such as murder excluded
children from juvenile jurisdiction.2 0 2 InMiller,
however, the Supreme Court accepted the idea
that, as proven by neuroscience and behavioral
research, that "children who commit even hei-
nous crimes are capable of change" and fur-
ther noted that the Court's previous holding in
Roper and Graham were not crime specific. 2 0 3
Additionally, the Miller Court looked to the
context in which a child is accused of murder,
and found that the state must give the juvenile
a meaningful opportunity to explain the con-
text around the crime, noting that "just as the
chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the
background and mental and emotional devel-
opment of a youthful defendant be duly con-
sidered' in assessing his culpability." 204 Looking
at the context of the crime was a significant shift
from the Kent Court, which waived a hearing
for offenses of "heinous" character.205 Instead,
the Court in Miller believed that there are still
levels of culpability when a child is accused of
the gravest offense:
Such mandatory penalties, by their na-
ture, preclude a sentencer from taking
201 See supra Part II.a.
202 Kent, 383 U.S. at 564.
203 Miller, 567 U.S. at 463 ("none of what [Graham] said
about children about their distinctive (and transito-
ry) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities is
crime-specific"
204 Id. at 2466.
20 Kent, 383 U.S. at 564.
account of an offender's age and the
wealth of characteristics and circum-
stances attendant to it. Under these
schemes, every juvenile will receive
the same sentence as every other-the
17 year old and the 14 year old, the
shooter and the accomplice, the child
from a stable household and the child
from a chaotic and abusive one. And
still worse, each juvenile (including
these two 14 year olds) will receive
the same sentence as the vast majority
of adults committing similar homicide
offenses. 2 06
Therefore, under Miller, a kid who com-
mits murder is still a kid and even children
charged with serious offenses deserve a fair
hearing and opportunity to grow as an adult
outside of the walls of incarceration. 207 A fair
hearing would allow the Court to consider the
circumstances of the juvenile, outside of the of-
fense that he or she committed, in terms of his
or her immaturity, impetuosity, and inability to
appreciate risk based on chronological age.208
Furthermore, at a hearing, the juvenile's act will
be considered in the context of the juvenile's
history and family environment.209 Finally, if a
juvenile is convicted of murder but remains in
juvenile court, it is still possible that the court
could charge and convict him or her of a lesser
offense based on the limitations or disabilities
associated with youth.210
206 Id. at 2467 86.
20 See Simon Waxman, A Child Who Kills is Still a
Child (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.wbur.org/cognoscen-
ti/2014/01/02/philip-chism-simon-waxman (discussing
how statutory exclusion for homicide offenses plays out
in Massachusetts).
20s See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
209 Id. (mandatory sentencing schemes prevent courts
from taking into account "the family and home environ-
ment that surrounds him and from which he cannot
usually extricate himself no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional")
210 Id.
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2. Transfer to adult court exposes youth to
mandatory rmin imums that do not take into
account their chronological age.
The age of the defendant in all criminal
proceedings is relevant because kids are cate-
gorically less capable and more susceptible to
change based on modern scientific studies.2 11
Mandatory transfer mechanisms ultimately
place children, if convicted, in the realm of
mandatory transfer schemes that prevent judg-
es from taking account of the central consid-
erations of youth.212 Even though the Supreme
Court has ruled that juveniles cannot be sen-
tenced to death or life without parole, there
are still a large amount of mandatory sentences
that still involve significant amounts of incar-
ceration that children would not be exposed to
in juvenile court.2 13 Mandatory minimums, by
definition, do not allow judges to take individ-
ualized factors into account even if they wanted
to, and juveniles tried in adult criminal court
are subject to the same mandatory minimum
sentences as their adult counterparts for nearly
all offenses, without consideration of their in-
herent diminished culpability.214
211 See supra Part II.
212 See Drinan, supra note 30.
213 See, e.g., Mary Price,Mill(er) ingMandatory Minimums:
What Federal Lawmakers Should Take from Miller c.
Alabama, 78 Mo. L. REV. 1147 (2013) (discussing the link
between mandatory minimums and over-incarceration
and urging that Miller-like emphasis on proportionality
can reduce incarceration levels).
214 See, e.g., James Orlando, Automatic Transfer ofJu-
veniles from Juvenile to Criminal Court, OFFICE OF LEG.
RESEARCH (2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/rpt/pd-
f/2016-R-0214.pdf (outlining the mandatory minimums
juveniles are exposed to under Connecticut's current
transfer laws); Rachael Frumin Eisenberg, As Though
They Are Children: Rep lacing Mandatory Minimums with
Individualized Sentencing Determinations for Juveniles in
Pennslyvania Criminal Court after Miller c. Alabama, 86
TEMP. L. REV. 215 (2013) (advocating for individualized
sentencing schemes in Pennsylvania based on juveniles
continued exposure to mandatory minimums).
The Court's discussion of the unique at-
tributes of children was anchored in social sci-
ence work, documenting the inchoate nature
of the adolescent brain.215 Current structures
that allow for children to be transferred this
way do not take age into consideration, which
is therefore in direct opposition to the Court's
holding in Roper, Graham, and Miller.2 1 6 By re-
moving youth from the balance -by subjecting
a juvenile to the mandatory minimum sentence
applicable to an adult-these laws still prohibit
a sentencing authority from assessing wheth-
er the law's minimum term of imprisonment
proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.2 1 7
Adolescents develop gradually and unevenly,
and chronological age and physical maturity
are not reliable indicators of development. Al-
though their offenses can be serious, much of
the behavior surrounding delinquency is not
abnormal during adolescence as under stress,
adolescents typically cannot use their most ad-
vanced judgment and decision-making skills.
A judge's ability to consider these key factors
should not be constrained by any mandatorily
imposed sentences, no matter how short.
3. The Supreme Court intended Miller to be
read broadly.
The Miller opinion states that a child's
developmental environment matters at sen-
tencing and thus, context matters when sen-
tencing juveniles outside of life without parole
21' Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 70 (2005) (dis-
cussing the lack of maturity and recklessness, suscepti-
bility to negative outside influences, and transient char-
acter of youth, citing the science behind each point).
216 Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 ("'An offender's age,' we made
clear in Graham, 'is relevant to the Eighth Amend-
ment,' and so 'criminal procedure laws that fail to take
defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed."') (quoting Graham v. United States, 560 U.S. 48,
56 (2010).
21 Miller, 567 U.S. at 467.
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to any kind of mandatory minimum sentence.218
The Miller Court even suggested in dicta, that
it was concerned with juvenile justice practices
on a broader scope than the life sentences that
were at issue in the case.21 9 The Court spent a
significant amount of its opinion responding
to the State's assertion that youth was already
taken into consideration at the transfer hearing
and therefore did not need to be considered
at a sentencing hearing.220 The Court rejected
this notion entirely because even though the
youth in Miller was given a transfer hearing,
many states use mandatory transfer systems or
direct file statutes, which place any discretion
solely in the hands of the prosecutor and do
not provide a mechanism for a judicial reval-
uation. 22 1 Additionally, the Court criticized ju-
dicial waiver statutes as being too general and
ambiguous. 222 Furthermore, the purpose of a
transfer hearing is dramatically different than
that of a sentencing hearing and judges are
faced with an extreme choice: giving a lenient
sentence in juvenile court or an extreme one in
adult court.223 Therefore, any statute that does
not even give youth a meaningful opportunity
to be heard at a transfer hearing does not com-
ply with the standard outlined in Miller, and it
is possible that even youth transferred through
judicial waiver may not have a significant op-
portunity to be evaluated as a child. By discuss-
ing the limitations of this system, the majority
indicated that its decision was not limited to
211 Id. ("the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here
prevent the sentencer from taking account of these
central considerations.")
219 Id.
220 Id. at 468.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 469 (noting that such laws are "usually silent
regarding standards, protocols, or appropriate consider-
ations for decisionmaking" and when states give power
to the judges, it "has limited utility," as judges have
limited information and juveniles have limited protec-
tions).
223 Id.
this particular sentence, but that it was an in-
dictment of broader juvenile justice practices
and criticizing the kind of general hearing pro-
visions outlined in Kent.2 24
4. Mandatory Transfer Violates a Juvenile's Eighth
Amendment Rights
The sentences in Roper, Graham, and
Miller were ultimately deemed to violate the
principle of proportionality, and therefore the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.2 2 5 Miller and Graham represented
an enormous break from Eighth Amendment
precedent dealing with non-death sentences
because children were at issue.226 The Supreme
Court previously set the bar for a challenge to
sentencing very high: "Although 'no penalty
is per se constitutional,' the relative lack of ob-
jective standards concerning terms of impris-
onment has meant that '[o]utside the context
of capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of particular sentences [are]
exceedingly rare. '"227
Therefore, based on this shift in under-
standing of an Eighth Amendment violation,
mandatory waiver provisions violate the indi-
vidualized requirements of the Eighth Amend-
ment as they deny juveniles any opportunity to
224 Additionally, the four dissenting judges in Miller
were even concerned that the majority's opinion would
be read too broadly. See id. 471 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing) ("the principle behind today's decision seems to
be only that because juveniles are different from adults,
they must be sentenced differently," and that such a
principle and the process the majority employed in
applying it "has no discernible end point."); See also id.
at 478 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Miller] lays the ground-
work for future incursions on the States' authority to
sentence criminals.").
221 Miller, 567 U.S. at 460.
226 Id.
221 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (finding a life
without parole sentence unconstitutional under a
South Dakota recidivist statute for a defendant who
passed a bad check).
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have their age and diminished capacity consid-
ered by any decision-maker at any stage of the
proceedings against them.
5. Like the death penalty in Roper and /fe without
parole in Graham andMiller, there is indicia of
national consensus moving against transferring
juveniles without a hearing.
Finally, when finding mandatory prac-
tices to be unconstitutional, the Court in Rop-
er and Graham looked to the current national
consensus on the death penalty and life with-
out parole, respectively. While the Court heav-
ily focused on an analysis of legislative trends
moving towards outlawing the death penalty in
Roper, it also noted that the United States is
the only country in the world that gives "official
sanction" to the juvenile death penalty.2 28 In
Graham, the Court noted that while thirty-sev-
en states, the District of Columbia, and the fed-
eral government permitted life without parole
sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders,
the actual sentencing practices of those juris-
dictions indicated that most states were hesi-
tant to sentence a juvenile to such a sentence.2 2 9
At the time of the decision, there were only 123
non-homicide juvenile offenders serving life
without parole sentences throughout the en-
tire country-and seventy-seven of them were
in Florida prisons. 230 Given the "exceedingly
rare" incidence of the punishment in question,
the Court held that there was a national con-
sensus against life without parole sentences for
non-homicide juvenile offenders.231 232
221 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
229 Graham, 560 U.S. at 61-63.
230 Id. at 64.
231 Id. at 67.
232 See Liz Ryan, With Juveniles, the World Should Not
Follow OurLead,THE CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL CHANGE (Dec.
11, 2014), https:/chronicleofsocialchange.org/opin-
ion/with-juveniles-the-world-should-not-follow-our-
lead/8926.
As discussed in Part I, like life without
parole, there are similar trends throughout the
country that show there is a national consensus
that children should not be transferred to adult
court without a hearing.2 33
B. All States Should be Required to Make
an Individualized Assessment of Each Youth
Based on Certain/Specific Factors Before
Transferring the Youth
Based on the holdings in Kent, Roper,
Miller, and Graham, this precedent, states should
only be allowed to transfer youth following a
transfer hearing in which a court individually
assesses a juvenile defendant and encompasses
the diminished culpability ofjuveniles and their
capacity for change. States, therefore, should
only transfer juveniles through the process of
judicial waiver as statutory exclusion and direct
file are unconstitutional under Miller. Only fif-
teen states now rely solely on traditional hear-
ing-based, judicially controlled forms of trans-
fer as contemplated in Kent.2 34 In these states,
all cases against juvenile-age offenders begin in
juvenile court and must be literally transferred,
by individual court order, to courts with crimi-
233 Juvenile transfer in the United States is also dispro-
portionate to the rest of the world the American crim-
inal justice system leads the word in incarcerating chil-
dren and no other county routinely processes youth in
adult criminal court compared to an estimated 250,000
in the U.S. annually. See id. Furthermore, the United
States is violating provisions of international human
rights conventions. For example, Article 37 of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) states that children who are detained should
be separated from adults and that they should not be
subject to 'torture' or other inhumane forms of punish-
ment. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. The United States is one of the
few countries that has not adopted the CRC. How-
ever, laws across the United States allow for children
charged as adults to be placed in adult jails without any
separation from adults, and less than half of these states
provide any measure of safety for children.
234 Kent, 383 U.S. at 541.
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nal jurisdiction, unless the state has a provision
keeping children who have already been pros-
ecuted once out of the juvenile jurisdiction
permanent. While, based on the purpose of the
juvenile justice system, it is preferable for all
children to stay in juvenile court, courts at the
very least should be required to give children a
meaningful hearing where they are considered
under factors that are consistent with Supreme
Court jurisprudence that recognize their status
as a child before exposing them to adult sen-
tencing laws and prisons.
First, cases involving children should
originate in juvenile court, regardless of the al-
leged offense on their prior record. If they are
then eligible for hearing based on a state's ju-
dicial waiver statutes, only the court should be
able to motion for a transfer hearing in order
to remove any discretionary power from the
prosecutor. The juvenile should be represent-
ed by counsel at the waiver hearing, and the
juvenile should have at least five days notice
in order to provide an adequate representa-
tion of the child's emotional, physical, and ed-
ucational history.2 35 Furthermore, the juvenile
should have access to an expert if necessary,
and should have access to all evidence avail-
able to the court to either support or contest
the motion.236 Any evidence presented should
be under oath and subject to cross-examina-
tion. At the hearing, the prosecuting attorney
should always bear the burden of proving that
probable cause exists to believe not only that
the juvenile has committed the offense, but
that the juvenile cannot be rehabilitated with-
in the juvenile court. The juvenile may remain
silent at the waiver hearing, and additionally
no admission by the juvenile during the waiv-
23' ABA Standards for Juvenile Justice, Standards Relat-
ing to Transfers Between Courts (1979).
236 Id.
er hearing should be admissible in subsequent
proceedings.
Second, at this hearing, courts must in-
dividually assess each juvenile as contemplated
in Kent, but based on factors that incorporate
modern scientific studies of adolescence as
well as recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
that recognizes that kids are different. Courts
should be required to consider all the same
specific set of factors, as outlined here, and
should be unable to transfer a child unless they
have made a finding on the record that the con-
ditions have been met.
Most states already consider the na-
ture of the offense when evaluating a child for
transfer.2 3 7 In Kent, the Court stated that the
following should be considered: "the serious-
ness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community
requires waiver," "whether the alleged offense
was committed in an aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated or willful manner," and "whether the
alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offens-
es against persons especially if personal injury
resulted." 2 38 Forty-one states currently consid-
er the offense committed in a juvenile waiver
hearing.239 However, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated that the focus should not be on the of-
fense itself, but that children are categorically
different. Furthermore, as the juvenile system
is supposedly rehabilitative instead of puni-
tive, the offense itself should not carry much
weight. The offense itself should not matter in
terms of what it looks like on paper, but should
only be analyzed in context, not as an isolated
act. Courts should not determine "premedita-
tion, willful, or other similar words," but should
231 See infra Appendix C.
231 Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.
231 See infra Appendix C.
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analyze the offense with more adolescent ap-
propriate standards in light of what personal
facts led up to the commission of the offense.
Based on this, courts should also not be able to
consider the prior record of the child without
context and without also considering why the
child was not fully rehabilitated by the system,
especially if it was based on a lack of rehabili-
tative resources or a mental condition that re-
mained untreated since the previous offense
was committed.
The Kent Court instructed that whether
or not the juvenile had associates in adult court
should be a consideration in the transfer de-
cision, and nine courts currently consider this
factor.2 4 0 However, convenience should not be
a consideration in juvenile transfer. Juveniles
should not be held to the same level of cul-
pability as their adult co-defendants, as often
those co-defendants are the very individuals
suscepting the juveniles to the peer pressure
that Roper indicated contributed to a juvenile's
responsibility.241
In terms of maturity, both the Kent Court
and thirty-five states consider the sophisti-
cation and maturity of the juvenile.2 42 Some
states have expanded on this, and consider
the psychological development and emotional
state of the minor, including any document-
ed mental illness or developmental issues. 2 4 3
However, none of these transfer statutes state
at what maturity level a child becomes eligible
for transfer. A child, therefore, should only be
eligible for transfer if they are deemed to have
240 Kent, 383 U.S. at 567; see infra Appendix C.
241 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 juveniles "are more vulner-
able ... to negative influences and outside pressures,"
including from their family and peers; they have limited
"contro [1] over their own environment" and lack the
ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-pro-
ducing settings.)
242 Kent, 383 U.S. at 567; see infra Appendix C.
243 See infra Appendix C.
the emotionally maturity and decision-making
capability of an adult. Otherwise, their mental
status as children should keep them in juvenile
court. As far as physical maturity, there should
be a minimum age imposed on when a child
can be eligible for transfer based for all offens-
es. A child should then be evaluated to see if
they developmentally meet the standards of
other youth their age, or if there are any mental
disabilities or lingering traumatic experiences
that would preclude them for developing at the
appropriate rate.
Next, Kent instructed courts to consid-
er "[t]he sophistication and maturity of the ju-
venile as determined by consideration of his
home, environmental situation, emotional at-
titude, and pattern of living."2 4 4 Twenty-three
states currently consider the juvenile's home or
family environment, including the effect that
familial, adult, or peer pressure may have had
on the child's alleged actions in question.2 4 5
This should be a required factor in all jurisdic-
tions and should be expanded to include new
research based on trauma and the susceptibili-
ties of children to peer pressure.
Kent, as well as thirty-four states, con-
sidered the prospects for adequate protec-
tion of the community. 2 46 If this factor is even
to be considered, there should be set criteria
and reasons that would allow a court to find
that the community cannot be protected by
isolating the minor in a juvenile setting; this
should not be an arbitrary statement. However,
the decision on whether or not to hold a juve-
nile should only be considered when evaluat-
ing their release pre-trial and should not be a
factor in a transfer hearing. Additionally, while
Kent and thirty-two states consider whether
244 Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.
241 See infra Appendix C.
241 Kent, 383 U.S. at 567; see infra Appendix C.
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the juvenile can be rehabilitated within the
time frame of juvenile court jurisdiction, and
if the juvenile court has facilities available that
would address the child's individual needs, 247
the Court should not be able to forego rehabil-
itation solely based on the likelihood that it is
unlikely to occur. There should be a presump-
tive burden that the child can be rehabilitated,
and it should be a large burden on the govern-
ment to prove otherwise.
Only fourteen states currently consider
the culpability of juvenile when assessing them
for transfer, and this factor was not even con-
sidered in Kent.248 Given that the lessened cul-
pability of children is at the heart of the Roper,
Graham, and Miller cases, this should be a man-
datory consideration when attempting to trans-
fer a child. Kent and eleven states consider the
impact on the victim when deciding whether to
transfer a child. Such a consideration should
only be considered at sentencing, as the injury
suffered by a person does not have any impact
on the finding that an individual committed an
offense. As the child has not yet been found
guilty of the offense he or she is being trans-
ferred for, the victim impact should only be
considered at sentencing if the child is even-
tually adjudicated or found guilty. Finally, six
states consider whether the offense was com-
mitted as part of gang activity, even though this
factor was not originally proposed in Kent.2 4 9
Contrary to current statutory requirements,
gang involvement should actually make it less
likely that the juvenile is transferred, instead
of an aggravating factor. In Miller, the Court
explained that juvenile offenders are less cul-
pable than adults because they are less able to
assess risk; they are more susceptible to outside
influences; and they do not have a fully devel-
247 Kent, 383 U.S. at 567; see infra Appendix C.
241 See infra Appendix C.
249 Id.
oped character.2 50 The gang setting magnifies
all of these concerns.
CONCLUSION
Based on the Supreme Court's decision
in Kent as well as its recent jurisprudence, states
should repeal all mandatory transfer statutes.
Mandatory transfer directly contradicts the Su-
preme Court's recognition that individualized
review of a youth's history, the circumstances
of the offense, and a youth's ability to charge
are critical to determining a youth's sentence.
Mandatory transfer statutes take away a court's
ability to make this individualized, appropriate
assessment of youth asjuvenile courts, not adult
courts, were specifically created to address the
individualized needs of youth. Finally, man-
datory transfer statutes are not necessary to
ensure youth who commit serious offense are
held accountable - repealing mandatory trans-
fer does not limit a state's ability to try a youth
as an adult, it merely means that the child will
first have an appropriate hearing.
250 Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
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APPENDIX A
Methods of Transfer by State
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 8-327
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
R iq-rnital I
Ariz. -ev. btat. Ann.
§ 13-501(b)
Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-27-318
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 707 § 602(b)
Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 19-2-518
Conn. Gen. Stat.Connecticut53a-54d
Del. Code Ann.
§ 1010
Ariz. i-ev. btat. Ann.
9 2-n
Cal. VVelt. & Inst. Code
§ 707
D.C. Code D.C. Code
§ 16-2307 § 16-2301
Fla. Stat. Fla. Stat.
§ 985.556 § 985.557
Georgia Ga. Code Ga. Code§ 15-11-562 § 15-11-560
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat.§571-22
Idaho Idaho Code Ann. Idaho Code Ann.§20-508 § 20-509
Illinois705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 705 Ill. Comp. Stat.
405/5-805 405/5-130
Ind. Code Ann. Ind. Code Ann.
Indiana §§ 31-30-3-2, 3-3, 4-4, § 31-30-1-4
3-5, 3-6
Iowa Code Iowa Code
§ 232.45 § 232.8(c)
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann.§38-2347
KentuckyKy. Rev. Stat.§§ 635.10, 635.020
.ois.n La. Child Code Ann. La. Child Code Ann.
art. 857, 859, 862 art. 305
.n Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 3101
Md. Code Ann., Md. Code Ann.,
Maryland Cts. & Jud. Proc. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 3-8A-06 § 3-8A-03(d)
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New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio onU I XUv. Uuu§ 2152.12
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10AOklahoma^^^^^ Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 1OA Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 1OA8 2-5-101 1 2-5-205
Or Rev. Stat. Or. Rev. Stat.
Oregon §§ 419c.340, 419c.349,
419c.352, 419c.355 § 137.707
Pennsylvania 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 6355(a) § 6355(e)
R.I. Gen. LawsRhode Island RI e.Lw§ 14-1-7(a), (b)
. S.C. Code Ann. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-19-1210 § 63-19-20
S.D. Codified Laws S.D. Codified Laws
§ 26-11-4 § 26-11-3.1
Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 419c.364, 419c.367
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 6302
R.I. Gen. Laws
& 1A-1-7 1
6.U. GOalIled Laws
§ 26-11-4
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Tennessee Tenn. Code§ 37-1-134
Texas [ Tex. Farn. CodeI § 54.02
Utah Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-703
utan uoae Ann.
§ 78A-6-701
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33§5204 §§5201 (c), 5103, 5204
Virginia Va. Code Ann.§16.1-269.1
WashigtonWash. Rev. Stat. Wash. Rev. Stat.§ 13.40.110 § 13.04.030
.es .igii Wash. Rev. Stat.West Virginia §4--1§49-4-710
.icni Wis. Stat. Wis. Stat.Wisconsin W 938.18 938.183
WyomingWyo. Stat. Ann. Wyo. Stat. Ann.§14-6-237 § 14-6-203
Tenn. Code
§ 37-1-134
Tex. Farn. Code
§ 54.02(m)(1)
Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-603
Va. Code Ann.
§ 16.1-271
Wash. Rev. Stat.
6 13.40.020(15)
Wis. Stat.
8 938 183
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APPENDIX B
Judicial Waiver - Statutory Requirements for Hearings 251
Alabama Yes Yes State No
Alaska No No252  Court Offense
Arizona If requested Yes State No
Arkansas Yes No Any No
California Yes No State Offense
Colorado If requested Yes State Prior Record
Connecticut No Yes State No
Delaware No No State or Court No
D.C. No No253  State Offense
Florida Yes No254  State No
Georgia Yes Yes State No
Hawaii Yes No Court No
Idaho No No Any No
Illinois No Yes State Age
Indiana No Yes 255  State Age & Offense
Iowa Yes Yes Any No
Kansas No No State No
Kentucky No Yes State No
Louisiana Yes Yes State or Court No
Maine If requested Yes State Offense
Maryland No No256  Court No
Massachusetts
Michigan No Yes State No
Minnesota No Yes State Age & Offense
Mississippi Unless waived Yes Court No
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
No No State or Defense No
See supra Appendix A (listing all judicial waiver statutes by state).
212 In Alaska, probable cause is a factor to be considered, but is not required before a juvenile is transferred.
211 In D.C., for the purpose of the transfer hearing it is assumed that the child committed the delinquent act.
211 In Florida, probable cause is a factor to be considered, but is not required.
211 In Indiana, probable cause is required unless the minor is accused of a felony and has previously been charged
with a felony.
216 In Maryland, for the purpose of the transfer hearing, it is assumed that the child committed the delinquent act.
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Nevada Yes No State Always
New Hampshire No No257  Court Age & Offense
New Jersey No No State No
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina No Yes Court No
North Dakota No Reasonable Grounds Court Offense
Ohio Yes Yes Court No
Oklahoma Yes Prospective Merit State or Court No
Oregon No No258  Court No
Pennsylvania No Prima Facie Case Court Age & Offense
Rhode Island No Yes State Prior Record
South Carolina No No259  State or Court No
South Dakota No No Court Age
Tennessee No Yes Court No
Texas Yes Yes Court No
Utah If requested Yes State Offense
Vermont No Yes State No
Virginia Yes Yes State Always
Washington No No Any No
West Virginia No No State No
Wisconsin No No State or Defense No
Wyoming No No Any No
211 In New Hampshire, courts only must consider the prospective merit of the complaint as a factor in the transfer
decision.
218 In Oregon, courts only must consider the prospective merit of the complaint as a factor in the transfer decision.
211 In South Carolina, a minor can only be transferred after a "full investigation" has been made, but a probable
cause requirement is not specified.
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APPENDIX C
Judicial Waiver - Factors Considered at Transfer Hearing260
x x xY
X X
X X
X X X X X
California Any X X X X X X
Colorado Any X X
ConnecticutJ All lX X
Delaware Any X X
X X X X X
X
X X X X
DC All X X X X X262 X
Florida Any X X X X X X
Georgia Other
Hawaii All
X X X X
X
X X X X X
X X
X
X X
X
X
X
X X
x
X
X X X
X X
X
X
X X X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X X
X
Idaho Some X X X
Illinois All X X X
Indiana Some X X
Iowa Other X X
Kansas All X X x
X
X
X
X
Kentucky 2+ X X X X X
Louisiana All
Maine All
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
All
N/A
All
Minnesota All X 
Mississippi All X263 X
X X X X
X
X
X
X
X X
Missouri 264 Other X X X X X X X
260 See supra Appendix A (listing all judicial waiver statutes by state).
261 Arkansas requires courts to specifically consider the juvenile's social and educational history.
262 D.C. considers if whether or not family counseling would increase the potential rehabilitation of the juvenile.
26 Mississippi requires courts to consider if the offense occurred on school property or put any other students in
danger.
264 Missouri requires courts to be mindful of racial disparities in certification of juveniles as adults.
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All X X X
All X* X X X X X
All X X X X X X
.6 Ohio gives more guidance on what makes a juvenile "culpable," and requires a court to consider if defendant was
provoked and if the defendant knew actions would cause the harm that occurred.
266 Oklahoma additionally requires courts to consider if the offense was committed while escaping or attempting to
escape from an institution for delinquent children.
... South Carolina does not specify any specific factors for courts to consider.
26. Virginia is the only state that allows the judge to consider the potential sentence if the juvenile is convicted as an
adult; specifically, if the maximum sentence for the crime if committed by an adult would exceed 20 years.
261 Washington does not list any specific factors for courts to consider.
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